The New Member Problem in the Cooperative Management of the Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna

In this paper the new member problem faced by the regional fisheries management organisations is discussed for a typical highly migratory species: the northern Atlantic bluefin tuna. The analysis is based on simulation and optimisation results from a bio-economic model. The results, for both the East and the West Atlantic stocks, show that presently the threat of the new members is not relevant for the breakdown of the cooperative management. This is due to the very low level of the stock, which makes noncooperation a low payoff strategy. As the optimal cooperative strategy calls for an initial harvest moratorium the threat becomes progressively more relevant, showing that this is a dynamic problem which is aggravated in the long run. Two possible solutions for this problem are simulated: transferable membership and waiting period. The simulation results show that a transferable membership scheme, if properly implemented, is fully efficient in protecting the cooperative agreements of the regional fisheries organisations from the free rider actions of the prospective new members. The waiting period, although protecting the member countries generally does not preclude such behaviours.

The New Member Problem in the Cooperative Management of the Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna

In this paper the new member problem faced by the regional fisheries management organisations is discussed for a typical highly migratory species: the northern Atlantic bluefin tuna. The analysis is based on simulation and optimisation results from a bio-economic model. The results, for both the East and the West Atlantic stocks, show that presently the threat of the new members is not relevant for the breakdown of the cooperative management. This is due to the very low level of the stock, which makes noncooperation a low payoff strategy. As the optimal cooperative strategy calls for an initial harvest moratorium the threat becomes progressively more relevant, showing that this is a dynamic problem which is aggravated in the long run. Two possible solutions for this problem are simulated: “transferable membership” and “waiting period”. The simulation results show that a “transferable membership” scheme, if properly implemented, is fully efficient in protecting the cooperative agreements of the regional fisheries organisations from the free rider actions of the prospective new members. The “waiting period”, although protecting the member countries generally does not preclude such behavioursN/

International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty: Does the Veil of Uncertainty Help?

Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce uncertainty about the environmental impact of emissions and the cost of reducing them, this conclusion is intriguing. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we analyze whether the result carries over to a more general setting without restriction on the number of players and which considers not only no and full learning but also partial learning. Second, we test whether the conclusion also holds if there is uncertainty about abatement costs instead of uncertainty about the benefits from global abatement. Third, we propose a transfer scheme that mitigates the possible negative effect of learning and which may even transform it into a positive effect.transnational cooperation, self-enforcing international environmental agreements, uncertainty, learning

THE NEW-MEMBER PROBLEM IN THE COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES

This paper discusses the threat that new members pose to the cooperative agreements in the management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks and the possible solutions to this problem. In particular, the main solutions proposed in the fisheries literature are explored-namely the "transferable membership," the "waiting period" and the "fair sharing rule." The analysis is illustrated by a typical highly migratory species: the northern Atlantic bluefin tuna. The application of the analysis to the bluefin tuna fishery case study shows that, at present, the threat of the new members is not sufficient for the breakdown of the cooperative agreement. The simulation results for this case study show that both the "transferable membership" and the "fair sharing rule" solutions solve the potential new member threat.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

OPTIMAL MANAGEMENT OF THE NORTHERN ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TUNA

This paper analyzes the optimal management of the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna, both eastern and western stocks. The analysis is based on a deterministic multi-gear and age-structured bioeconomic model. In order to assess the importance of the gear structure in this fishery, the model is optimized in two scenarios. In the first, the strategies are restricted to the gear mix of the base year, whereas in the second, the optimal gear mix is estimated. For both scenarios, optimal constant strategies are determined. The corresponding optimal use is then compared with an open-access scenario. Also, optimal non-constant strategies are explored. As expected, the gear structure of the fishery proved to be highly relevant in the optimal payoffs. In particular, the unrestricted strategies yield rents substantially higher than the restricted ones. Also, the optimal management of the bluefin tuna fishery, in both the East and West Atlantic, would imply significant reallocation of the gear shares.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries

We argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the impact of multiple characteristics on the incentive structure of impure public good provision. The degree of technical excludability is related to the pattern of fish migration, the degree of socially constructed excludability is captured by the design of international law and the degree of rivalry is reflected by the growth rate of the resource. We construct a bioeconomic model, including the high seas and exclusive economic zones in order to study the incentives to form stable fully or partially cooperative agreements. We show that the spatial allocation of property rights is crucial for the success of cooperation as long as technical excludability is sufficiently high. Moreover, we show how economic and ecological factors influence the success of cooperation.pure and impure public goods, technical and socially constructed nonexcludability, property rights, coalition formation, free-riding, bioeconomic model, shared fish stocks, regional fisheries management organizations.

MANAGEMENT OF THE NORTHERN ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TUNA: AN APPLICATION OF C-GAMES

This paper considers the prospects for cooperative multilateral management of the North Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks signed in December 1995. A three-players characteristic function game (c-game) is used to analyze the cooperative agreements. The analysis focuses on the sharing of total net returns from cooperation. Three sharing rules are calculated; namely, the Nucleolus, the Shapley value, and the Nash bargaining solution. The analysis is based on simulation and optimization results from a multi-gear, age-structured, bioeconomic model developed for the North Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries, East and West stocks. The results show, as expected, that significant gains can be attained from cooperation. The different sharing rules for the distribution of gains provide different returns to each player. Nonetheless, the basic transfer payments structure is rather stable. This case study points out some particular situations where these solutions are not enough to guarantee cooperation between all the coastal states.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

International environmental agreements under uncertainty: does the veil of uncertainty help?

Working paperNa and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce uncertainty about the environmental impact of emissions and the cost of reducing them, this conclusion is intriguing. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we analyze whether the result carries over to a more general setting without restriction on the number of players and which considers not only no and full learning but also partial learning. Second, we test whether the conclusion also holds if there is uncertainty about abatement costs instead of uncertainty about the benefits from global abatement. Third, we propose a transfer scheme that mitigates the possible negative effect of learning and which may even transform it into a positive effect

Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation

This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy, has been superficial. Combining a two-stage game of four asymmetric players with a comprehensive bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the Relative Stability Principle is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is non-cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies. The results indicate that partial cooperation is stable under a specific sharing scheme. It is also shown that substantial economic benefits could have been realised by reallocating the fishing effort.Atlantic salmon, bioeconomic model, coalition formation, partition function, sharing rules, stability analysis, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

The Role of Uncertainty and Learning for the Success of International Climate Agreements

Technological developments intensify linkages between nations, making unilateral policies less effective. Though transnational externalities (e.g. trade, contagious diseases and terrorism) warrants coordination and cooperation between governments, this proves some times difficult. This is particularly true for international environmental agreements. One reason for meager success is the public good character of environmental protection encouraging free-riding. Another reason one might suspect are the large uncertainties surrounding most environmental problems, and in particular climate change, providing sufficient excuse to remain inactive. Paradoxically, some recent papers have concluded just the opposite: the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of international environmental cooperation. This sheds serious doubts on the benefits from research on better understanding environmental impacts. In this paper, we explain why and under which conditions such a pessimistic conclusion can be true. However, taking a broader view, we argue that these unfavorable conditions are rather an exception than the rule. Most important, we suggest a mechanism that mitigates the negative effect of learning and which may even turn it into a positive effect. Our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems of cooperation in the presence of externalities